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Abstract
We analyze the Vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players
have both Knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences. In this
model, the Vickrey mechanism is no longer dominant-strategy, and we prove that all dominant-
strategy mechanisms are inadequate. However, we also prove that, in undominated strategies,
the social welfare produced by the Vickrey mechanism in the worst case is not only very good,
but also essentially optimal.
Keywords: Knightian uncertainty, implementation in undominated strategies, incomplete pref-
erences
1 Introduction
We prove that the classical Vickrey mechanism guarantees good social welfare even when the players
have extremely limited knowledge about themselves.
Recall that the Vickrey mechanism efficiently allocates multiple identical goods by ensuring that
it is a dominant strategy for each player i to report his true valuation, θ∗i . In real life, however, a
player i may be uncertain about θ∗i , as it may depend on variables that are not directly observable
by him. A simple way to capture a player i’s uncertainty about his own valuation is the ‘single-
distribution’ model, where i does not know θ∗i , but only the true distribution from which θ
∗
i has
been drawn. We instead investigate a more general form of self uncertainty.
Knightian Valuation Uncertainty. In our model, the only information that a player i has
about θ∗i (and more generally about the true valuation profile, θ
∗) consists of a set of distributions,
from one of which θ∗i has been drawn. We refer to this model as Knightian valuation uncertainty or
the Knightian valuation model, as it is a special case of the uncertainty model envisaged by Frank
H. Knight almost a century ago [19], and later formalized by Truman F. Bewley [4].
Knightian valuation uncertainty may arise from conflicting expert opinions. Consider a multi-
unit auction of a novel good. Unable to evaluate his valuation, a player i hires multiple (properly
incentivized) independent experts to figure it out, trusting that at least one of them will be right.
If each of them reports a different distribution for θ∗i , either because time was limited or because
some of the experts made errors, then i is ultimately faced with a set of distributions, from one of
which θ∗i has been drawn.
∗We would like to thank the Econometrica editor and our anonymous referees for very valuable and patient
guidance, without which these three computer scientists would have been unable to write the paper.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
40
3.
64
13
v3
  [
cs
.G
T]
  2
4 A
pr
 20
15
Incomplete Preferences. One may of course assume that players with Knightian valuation
uncertainty have complete preferences, and in particular maxmin preferences, as defined by Gilboa
and Schmeidler [16]. Such preferences are certainly defendable, however, quoting Bewley [4], they
“do not lead to the sorts of economic behavior which make Knightian behavior interesting.”
In our paper, players have incomplete preferences. A player i, only knowing that his true
valuation has been selected from one of multiple distributions, prefers an outcome ω to another
outcome ω′ if and only if his expected utility for ω is higher than or equal to his expected utility
for ω′ with respect to all such distributions (and strictly greater for at least some of them). As a
consequence, some outcomes or some strategies may be incomparable to him.
Finally, we do not assume that a player with incomparable strategies chooses a ‘reference strat-
egy’. That is, we do not rely on the inertia assumption of Bewley [4]. However, we assume that
the players are risk-neutral.
Findings. In the Knightian valuation model, the Vickrey mechanism is no longer dominant-
strategy, but multi-unit dominant-strategy mechanisms still exist: for instance, the ‘degenerate’
mechanism, which assigns all copies the good to a random player. Our Theorem 1 shows that all
dominant-strategy mechanisms, as well as all ex-post Nash mechanisms, whether deterministic or
randomized, must essentially be degenerate. That is, we provide natural conditions under which
the allocations of such mechanisms are unresponsive to each player’s action and thus cannot be
efficient. Importantly, Theorem 1 applies also to mechanisms that allow a player to report a set of
valuation distributions rather than a single valuation.
Since dominant-strategy mechanisms cannot achieve even an approximately efficient outcome in
our model, it is natural to ask what social-welfare performance can be guaranteed in undominated
strategies. After all, one may be quite confident that a player will not choose a strategy outside
his undominated set.
Our Theorem 2 characterizes the set of undominated strategies of a player with Knightian valua-
tion uncertainty in the Vickrey mechanism. A simple corollary of this characterization, Corollary 1,
guarantees that, in undominated strategies, the social-welfare performance of the Vickrey mecha-
nism is good even in the worst case.
This guarantee, of course, does not exclude that a different mechanism may perform even better.
However, our Theorem 3 shows that the worst-case performance of the Vickrey mechanism is, de
facto, asymptotically optimal among all undominated-strategy mechanisms, probabilistic or not, no
matter what their strategy spaces may be. That is, as the number of players grows, no mechanism
assigning finitely many pure strategies to each player can out-perform the Vickrey one in the worst
case.
In Sum. Our theorems together show that, for risk-neutral players, the classical Vickrey mecha-
nism is very robust to alternative specifications of preferences and information structures. Indeed,
as most things classical, it outlives the confines in which it was conceived, and continues to be
relevant in new and unforeseen settings. We believe that such robustness is an important property
of a mechanism.
Related Work. Knightian uncertainty has received much attention in decision theory. Au-
mann [1]; Dubra, Maccheroni and Ok [11]; Ok [27]; and Nascimento [26] investigate decision with
incomplete orders of preferences. Various criteria for selecting a single distribution out of a set of
distributions have been studied by Danan [8]; Schmeidler [29]; Gilboa and Schmeidler [16]; and
Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [23]. Bose, Ozdenoren and Pape [6] and Bodoh-Creed [5] use
the model from Gilboa and Schmeidler [16] to study auctions. General equilibrium models with
incompletely ordered preferences have been considered by Mas-Colell [24]; Gale and Mas-Colell [14];
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Shafer and Sonnenschein [30]; and Fon and Otani [12]. Rigotti and Shannon [28] have characterized
the set of equilibria in a financial market problem with incomplete preferences.
Mechanisms with Knightian uncertainty were first considered by Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shan-
non [21]. They do not focus on auctions, but on the rental extraction problem. (See Appendix G
for a technical comparison.)
Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon also studied variants of the notions they proposed in [21] for a
principal-agent model with Knightian uncertainty [22].
Di Tillio, Kos and Messner [10] and Bose and Renou [7] have studied ambiguous mechanisms,
assuming that the players have maxmin preferences [16]. Informally, ambiguous mechanisms do
not map a profile of strategies to a single outcome, but to an outcome arbitrarily chosen from a set
of outcomes. Thus, in a sense, they ‘exogenously introduce Knightian uncertainty’.
Full implementation in (traditional) undominated strategies was proposed by Jackson [17, 18].
An example of such implementation in the exact-valuation model is given by the mechanism of
Babaioff et al. [3] for efficiency in multi-good auctions where each player may be interested in
different bundles of the goods, but has the same value for each such bundle.
2 Model
2.1 Notation for Multi-Unit Auctions
We study auctions of a homogenous good in which players have multi-unit demand. We denote by
n the number of players; by m the number of copies of the good; by [n] the set {1, 2, . . . , n}; and by
[m] the set {1, 2, . . . ,m}. The set of all possible allocations is A def= {A ∈ Zn≥0 ∣∣ ∑ni=0Ai = m}. In
an allocation A ∈ A, A0 is the number of unallocated copies and Ai the number of copies allocated
to player i.
As in [2, 31], we assume non-increasing marginal valuations. For each player i, the set of possible
valuations is Θi
def
= {θi : [m] → R≥0 | θi(1) ≥ · · · ≥ θi(m) ≥ 0}, where for each valuation θi ∈ Θi
and each copy j ∈ [m], θi(j) represents player i’s marginal value for a j-th copy of the good. (We
may also refer to such a θi as an m-dimensional vector, and to θi(j) as its j-th coordinate.) The set
of all possible valuation profiles is Θ
def
= Θ1 × · · · × Θn. The profile of the players’ true valuations
is θ∗ def= (θ∗1, . . . , θ∗n) ∈ Θ.
The set of possible outcomes is Ω
def
= A × Rn≥0. If (A,P ) ∈ Ω, we refer to Pi as the price
charged to player i. The utility of a player i, with valuation θi, for an outcome ω = (A,P ) is
Ui(θi, ω)
def
=
∑Ai
j=1 θi(j)− Pi.
For every set X, we denote by ∆(X) the set of all countably additive probability measures on
X. If ω ∈ ∆(Ω), then Ui(θi, ω) is the expected utility of player i.
Relative to a valuation profile θ, the social welfare of an outcome ω = (A,P ) ∈ Ω, or the social
welfare of an allocation A ∈ A, is SW(θ, ω) = SW(θ,A) def= ∑i∑Aij=1 θi(j). The maximum social
welfare relative to θ is MSW(θ)
def
= maxA∈A SW(θ,A). The maximum social welfare is MSW
def
=
MSW(θ∗).
A mechanism M specifies, for each player i, a set of strategies Si. We interchangeably refer
to each member of Si as a pure strategy/action/report of i, and, similarly, to a member of ∆(Si)
as a mixed strategy/action/report of i.1 After each player i, simultaneously with his opponents,
1Often, in pre-Bayesian settings, the notion of a strategy and that of an action are distinct. Indeed, a strategy
si of a player i maps the set of all possible types of i to the set of i’s possible actions/reports. But since strategies
are universally quantified in all relevant definitions of this paper, we need not separate (and for simplicity do not
separate) the notions of strategies and actions.
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reports a strategy si in Si, M maps the reported strategy profile s to an outcome M(s) ∈ Ω. If M
is probabilistic, then M(s) ∈ ∆(Ω).2
When in a mechanism M the players jointly choose a profile of (possibly mixed) strategies
σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ ∆(S1)×· · ·×∆(Sn), we respectively denote by MPi (σ) and MAi,j(σ) the expected
price of player i and the probability that player i wins j copies of the good.
2.2 Knightian Valuation Uncertainty
In our model the players are risk-neutral and a player i’s sole information about the entire true
valuation profile θ∗ = (θ∗1, . . . , θ∗n) consists of a non-empty set of distributions, Ki ⊂ ∆(Θi), from
one of which θ∗i has been drawn. (The players’ true valuations are uncorrelated.)
Because a risk-neutral player cares only about his expected utility, and because in an auction
each Θi is convex, in our model a player i may ‘collapse’ each distribution Di ∈ Ki to its expectation
Eθi∼Di [θi] ∈ Θi. Accordingly, for auctions, our model can be equivalently restated in the following
non-distributional language.
Definition 2.1 (Knightian valuation model). For each player i, i’s sole information about θ∗ is
a non-empty set Ki ⊂ Θi, the candidate (valuation) set of i, such that θ∗i ∈ Ki. We refer to an
element of Ki as a candidate valuation. We denote by Ki the set of all possible candidate sets of
i, and let K def= K1 × · · · ×Kn.
We stress that Ki can be an arbitrary subset of 2Θi and that, in our model, i has no information
about the true valuation θ∗j or the candidate set Kj of an opponent j.
In this paper, we refer to a player or an auction as Knightian to emphasize that we are consid-
ering the player or the auction in the Knightian valuation model.
In this model, a mechanism’s performance will of course depend on the inaccuracy of the players’
candidate sets, which we measure as follows.
Definition 2.2. For all players i, candidate set Ki, and copies j ∈ [m], we let
Ki(j)
def
= {θi(j) | θi ∈ Ki}, K⊥i (j) def= inf Ki(j), and K>i (j) def= supKi(j).
A candidate set Ki is (at most) δ-approximate if K
>
i (j) −K⊥i (j) ≤ δ for all j ∈ [m]. An auction
is (at most) δ-approximate if, for each player i,
Ki ⊂ Kδi def= {Ki ∈ 2Θi |Ki is δ-approximate}.
We set Kδ def= Kδ1 × · · ·Kδn.
Note that a candidate set Ki may not be convex. For instance, in a single-good auction, Ki may
consist of the two valuations a and b, and thus not contain a+b2 . Let us stress that the possibility
of ‘holes’ in Ki is the necessary sub-product of the fact that each Ki is derived from an underlying
set of distributions, Ki, which is allowed to be totally arbitrary.3
2With our risk-neutral players, it would suffice to consider outcomes drawn from ∆(A)× Rn≥0.
3Note that candidate sets may be very expressive. In a single-good setting, consider a player i who believes that
his true valuation is either a or b, but more probably a than b. This belief corresponds to the set of distributions
K′i = {Dp | p ∈ [0.5, 1]} where each Dp is the distribution taking value a with probability p, and value b with
probability 1− p. Then, if i collapses each distribution Dp to its expected value, he de facto ends with the following
set of candidate valuations: K′i = {pa + (1 − p)b | p ∈ [0.5, 1]} ⊆ Θi. (If, after translating the above belief to a new
candidate set K′i, player i formed further beliefs about the probabilities of the valuations in K
′
i, then he could again
translate these beliefs to a new candidate set K′′i . And so on.)
When we say that the candidate set is Ki, we assume that all (partial) beliefs that player i may have about his
own valuation θ∗i have already been taken into account.
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3 The First Theorem
In this section, we prove that, under natural conditions, all dominant-strategy (and ex-post Nash)
mechanisms must yield inefficient allocations in the Knightian valuation model. We stress that this
result holds when such mechanisms are allowed to elicit from each player not just a single valuation,
but an arbitrary report: in particular, a set of valuations.
Since it is easy to see that the revelation principle continues to apply in our setting (see
Appendix A only for completeness sake), we state Theorem 1 in terms of Knightian dominant-
strategy truthfulness mechanisms, formally defined below.
Recall that Ki is the set of all possible candidate sets of player i.
Definition 3.1. A mechanism is Knightian direct if, for each player i, Si = Ki. Such a mechanism
M is Knightian dominant-strategy-truthful (Knightian DST) if
∀Ki,K ′i ∈ Ki ∀K−i ∈ K−i ∀θi ∈ Ki Ui
(
θi,M(Ki,K−i)
) ≥ Ui(θi,M(K ′i,K−i)).
To state Theorem 1, we also define a simple relation between candidate sets.
Definition 3.2. In an m-unit auction, two candidate sets Ki and K
′
i in Ki are
• adjacent, if span{(θi(1)− θ′i(1), . . . , θi(m)− θ′i(m)) ∣∣ θi, θ′i ∈ Ki ∩K ′i} = Rm, and
• connected, if there exist K(1)i , . . . ,K(t)i ∈ Ki such that Ki = K(1)i , K ′i = K(t)i , and K(k)i is
adjacent to K
(k+1)
i for all k ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1}.
Example 3.3. When m = 1, that is, in the case of single-good auctions, each candidate set is a
subset of the non-negative reals, and thus two candidate sets Ki and K
′
i in Ki are adjacent if and
only if |Ki ∩ K ′i| ≥ 2. Indeed, taking two different reals x, y ∈ Ki ∩ K ′i, the fact that x − y 6= 0
implies that the 1-dimensional vector (x− y) spans the 1-dimensional space R. Accordingly, if the
intervals [1, 3], [2, 4], and [3, 5] are possible candidate sets in Ki, then [1, 3] is adjacent to [2, 4], [2, 4]
is adjacent to [3, 5], and [1, 3] is connected (but not adjacent) to [3, 5].
Consider next an m-unit auction. Let Ki be the candidate set consisting of all the valuations
θi ∈ Θi such that θi(j) ∈ [1, 3] for all j ∈ [m], and K ′i the candidate set consisting of all the
valuations θ′i ∈ Θi such that θ′i(j) ∈ [2, 4] for all j ∈ [m]. Then, Ki and K ′i are adjacent if they
both belong to Ki. This is so because the set of m-dimensional vectors
{(
θi(1)− θ′i(1), . . . , θi(m)−
θ′i(m)
) ∣∣ θi, θ′i ∈ Ki∩K ′i} contains the m vectors (1, 0, . . . , 0), (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), · · · , (0, . . . , 0, 1), which
span Rm.
Theorem 1. In an m-unit Knightian auction, for all δ > 0, all K ⊆ Kδ, all (possibly probabilistic)
Knightian DST mechanisms M ,4 all (K1, . . . ,Kn) ∈ K, all players i, all K ′i ∈ Ki connected to
Ki, and all copies j ∈ [m],
MAi,j(Ki,K−i) = M
A
i,j(K
′
i,K−i) and M
P
i (Ki,K−i) = M
P
i (K
′
i,K−i) .
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 1 essentially states that the probability that a Knightian DST mechanism M assigns
a given number of copies of the good to a given player i, and also the price player i pays, are
independent of the candidate sets i reports, provided that they are connected and that the reports
of i’s opponents are fixed.
4Note that Theorem 1 holds even if the mechanism M is allowed to know δ and K in advance.
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This independence from individual players’ reports prevents a Knightian DST mechanism from
guaranteeing high social welfare, when the players’ possible candidate sets are sufficiently rich. For
instance, consider a single-good auction in which δ = 2, and each Ki includes the intervals [0, 2],
[1, 3], [2, 4], . . . , [B,B + 2] for some large integer B. Then, no matter what the DST mechanism
M might be, when the reported profile of candidate sets is K =
(
[0, 2], [0, 2], . . . , [0, 2]
) ∈ K, one
of the players, without loss of generality player 1, must receive the good with probability at most
1/n: in symbols, MA1,1(K) ≤ 1/n. This implies that the probability that player 1 gets the good
remains at most 1/n even when all his opponents report the interval [0, 2] and he reports [B,B+2].
This is so because the intervals [0, 2] and [B,B+ 2] are connected and thus Theorem 1 implies that
MA1,1
(
[0, 2], [0, 2], . . . , [0, 2]
)
= MA1,1
(
[B,B + 2], [0, 2], . . . , [0, 2]
)
. Accordingly, if [B,B + 2] were the
true candidate set of player 1, and [0, 2] the true candidate set for everyone else, then the maximum
social welfare would be at least B, while the expected social welfare delivered by M would be at
most B/n+ 2.5
4 The Second Theorem
Our second theorem proves a very attractive relationship between a player’s candidate set and his
undominated strategies in the Vickrey mechanism for multi-unit Knighitian auctions.
Recall that the Vickrey mechanism, denoted by Vickrey, is a direct mechanism (i.e., satisfies
Si = Θi) and maps a profile of valuations θ ∈ Θ1 × · · · × Θn, to an outcome (A,P ); where
A ∈ arg maxA∈A SW(θ,A), Pi = MSW(θ−i) −
∑
k 6=i
∑Ak
j=1 θk(j), and possible ties are broken lexi-
cographically.6
For the Knightian valuation model, we define undominated strategies as follows.
Definition 4.1. In a mechanism M , a pure strategy si ∈ Si of a player i is (weakly) dominated
by another possibly mixed strategy σi ∈ ∆(Si) of i with respect to his Ki, in symbols si ≺(i,Ki) σi, if
(1) ∀θi ∈ Ki ∀s−i ∈ S−i Ui
(
θi,M(σi, s−i)
) ≥ Ui(θi,M(si, s−i)), and
(2) ∃θi ∈ Ki ∃s−i ∈ S−i Ui
(
θi,M(σi, s−i)
)
> Ui
(
θi,M(si, s−i)
)
.7
A strategy si ∈ Si is (weakly Knightian) undominated, if there exists no σi ∈ ∆(Si) such that
si ≺(i,Ki) σi. We denote the set of undominated strategies of player i by UDi(Ki).
If K is a product or a profile of candidate sets, that is, if K = (K1, . . . ,Kn) or K = K1×· · ·×Kn,
then UD(K)
def
= UD1(K1)× · · · × UDn(Kn).
5We note that such poor social-welfare performance indeed relies on the richness of the players’ possible candidate
sets. If the players’ possible candidate sets were guaranteed to be sufficiently separated, then a properly designed
dominant-strategy mechanism could always achieve the maximum social welfare. For instance, consider an n-player
auction of a single good where
• the inaccuracy parameter δ = 1/3,
• the set of possible candidate sets Ki = {[kn+ i, kn+ i+ 13 ] | k ∈ Z+} for each player i, and
• the mechanism M is such that (1) Si = {kn+ i | k ∈ Z+} for each player i, and (2) for all s ∈ S1 × · · · × Sn,
M(s) = 2P(s), where 2P is the second-price mechanism.
Then, it is clear that (a) for player i whose true candidate set is [kn+ i, kn+ i+ 1
3
], reporting kn+ i is a dominant
strategy, and (b) when dominant strategies are played, M produces an outcome with maximum social welfare.
6More precisely, on a reported valuation profile θ, the Vickrey mechanism sorts the values {θi(j) | i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]}
in a non-increasing order, and then chooses the m largest entries to assign the m copies of the good. Namely, if
θi(1), θi(2), . . . , θi(j) belong to the largest m entries, but not θi(j + 1), then Vickrey assigns j copies of the good to
player i. If ties occur in this ordering, that is, if θi(j) = θi′(j
′), then θi(j) precedes θi′(j
′) if and only if either (1)
i < i′ or (2) i = i′ and j < j′.
7This notion is thus different from strong dominance, where inequality (1) is always strict. For strong dominance
in the the exact-valuation case, see, for instance, [13, 20].
6
Our notion of an undominated strategy intends to capture the ‘weakest condition’ for which si
should be discarded in favor of σi, and is a natural extension of its classical counterpart.
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Note that Jackson’s more involved definition of an undominated strategy is not necessary in
our paper.9
Now let us formally state our second theorem.
Theorem 2. In an m-unit Knightian auction with the Vickrey mechanism, for all players i and
all candidate sets Ki, the set of undominated strategies UDi(Ki) coincides with the set of all
strategies vi ∈ Θi satisfying the following condition
∀j ∈ [m] vi(j) ∈
[
K⊥i (j),K
>
i (j)
]
.
Theorem 2 is proved in Appendix C.
Theorem 2 is obvious for m = 1, but less obvious when there are multiple copies of the good.
In particular, a player i may consider ‘under-reporting’ his value for the j-th copy of the good, but
‘over-reporting’ his value for the k-th copy. For example, in a 3-unit auction, where Ki consists of
all valuations θi ∈ Θi such that
θi(1) ∈ [100, 110], θi(2) ∈ [95, 105], and θi(3) ∈ [90, 100] ,
by reporting the valuation vi = (113, 98, 80), i over-reports his value for the first copy but under-
reports that for the third copy. Such a strategy vi is, in general, not dominated by reporting the
highest —respectively, the lowest— possible value for each copy of the good: that is, it is not
dominated by reporting (110, 105, 100) —respectively, (100, 95, 90). However, one can still carefully
construct a strategy v∗i that dominates vi, and therefore conclude that a rational player will not use
any such strategy vi. In our example, such a v
∗
i could be (110, 98, 80), (113, 98, 90), or (110, 98, 90).
A general (but not the only) way to construct a v∗i dominating vi is to set v
∗
i (j) = vi(j) for
every copy j such that vi(j) belongs to [K
⊥
i (j),K
>
i (j)], set v
∗
i (j) = K
⊥
i (j) if vi < K
⊥
i (j), and set
v∗i (j) = K
>
i (j) if vi > K
>
i (j). (We rely on the non-increasing marginal valuation assumption in
order to show that the so-constructed v∗i dominates vi.)
The above construction of v∗i is the key idea to show that every vi ∈ UDi(Ki) satisfies vi(j) ∈[
K⊥i (j),K
>
i (j)
]
for every copy j. A similar idea is needed to show the other direction. The details
can be found in Appendix C.
Remark 4.2. For a Knightian player i, the set of undominated strategies UDi(Ki) may strictly
contain the candidate set Ki. For example, in a single-good second-price auction, if Ki = {4, 7, 21},
then not only reporting 4, 7, or 21 is an undominated strategy for player i, but so is reporting 9. As
for another example, in a 2-unit Vickrey auction, if Ki = {(78, 60), (80, 50)}, then not only reporting
(78, 50) and (80, 50), but also (79, 51), (79, 52), . . . , (79, 59), etc., are undominated strategies.
8Of course, other extensions are also possible. To express condition (2) in Definition 4.1, we must quantify the
true valuation θi ∈ Ki and the pure strategy subprofile of i’s opponents s−i ∈ S−i. There are three alternatives
to consider. Namely, (a) ∀θi∀s−i, (b) ∃θi∀s−i, and (c) ∀θi∃s−i. Alternatives (a) and (b) do not yield the classical
notion of (weak) dominance when Ki is a singleton. Alternative (c) fails to capture the ‘weakest condition’ for which
si should be discarded in favor of σi. (Indeed, since σi is already no worse than si, for player i to discard strategy si
in favor of σi, it should suffice for si to be strictly worse than σi for a single possible valuation θi ∈ Ki.)
9To meaningfully deal with the possibility of having an infinite sequence of pure strategies one dominating another,
Jackson put forward, in the exact-valuation case, a more involved notion of an undominated strategy [17]. However,
this more involved notion is unnecessary, even in the Knightian setting, for the class of bounded mechanisms. This
class includes the Vickrey and all finite mechanisms, and thus all mechanisms analyzed in this paper in undominated
strategies.
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The multiplicity of undominated strategies in the two examples above emphasizes that our
Knightian player i has incomplete preferences. Assume for a moment that he had complete prefer-
ences: for instance, maxmin preferences. Then, his only undominated strategy (and thus his only
dominant strategy) would consist of reporting 4 in the former example, and (78, 52) in the latter
one.10
Theorem 2 has a simple corollary (proved for completeness in Appendix D) about the social-
welfare performance of the Vickrey mechanism.
Corollary 1. In an m-unit Knightian auction, for all δ ≥ 0, all products K of δ-approximate
candidate sets, all profiles v ∈ UD(K), and all θ ∈ K
SW
(
θ,Vickrey(v)
) ≥ MSW(θ)− 2mδ .
That is, the social welfare realized by the Vickrey mechanism is at most 2mδ away for the
maximum one, no matter which undominated strategies the players may choose. The following
example shows that this performance guarantee of the Vickrey mechanism is actually tight in the
worst case.
Example 4.3. Consider a two-player 10-approximate m-unit auction in which the candidate sets
are
K1 =
{
(90, 90, . . . , 90), (100, 100, . . . , 100)
}
K2 =
{
(100, 100, . . . , 100), (110, 110, . . . , 110)
}
.
In this case, the Vickrey mechanism may miss the maximum social welfare by 2δm as follows.
Player 1 is ‘optimistic’ and bids the valuation v1 = (100, . . . , 100); player 2 is ‘pessimistic’ and bids
v2 = (100, . . . , 100); the Vickrey mechanism (with the lexicographic tie-breaking rule) allocates
all copies of the good to player 1; the true valuation θ∗1 of player 1 is (90, . . . , 90); and the true
valuation θ∗2 of player 2 is (110, . . . , 110).
Accordingly, the realized social welfare is 90m, while the maximum one is 110m = 90m +
2mδ. 
The relevance of worst-case analyses can of course be debated, but if the worst-case performance
is good, then the typical performance can only be better. In our setting, a social-welfare loss of
2mδ is small whenever δ is small relative to MSW(θ)/m. For instance, this is the case of a 10-unit
auction in which a player’s valuation for each copy of the good is a million dollars plus or minus
$100. Indeed, in this case, Corollary 1 implies that the Vickrey mechanism guarantees that the
realized social welfare will be at least ten millions minus $2, 000, no matter how the players may
choose their undominated strategies. (A performance loss that is at most linear in δ should not
be underestimated. After all, Theorem 1 shows that the social welfare performance of any DST
mechanism can be terrible, no matter how small, but positive, δ may be.)
10In the spirit of Gilboa and Schmeidler [16], given an outcome ω = (A,P ), we can define the worst-case utility of
a player i with candidate set Ki to be minθi∈Ki Ui(θi, ω) = minθi∈Ki
∑Ai
j=1 θi(j) − Pi. In the above 2-unit auction
example, this worst-case utility is −Pi, if Ai = 0; is 78 − Pi, if Ai = 1; and is 130 − Pi, if Ai = 2. Therefore, i’s
worst-case utility coincides with the utility of a (non-Knightian) player whose true valuation is precisely (78, 52).
Indeed, minθi∈Ki Ui(θi, ω) = Ui
(
(78, 52), ω
)
for all possible outcomes ω. Now, a player i with maxmin preferences
compares every two outcomes ω and ω′ using his worst-case utility function, minθi∈Ki Ui(θi, ·). It is thus equivalent
for such a player i to compare ω and ω′ using the exact utility function Ui
(
(78, 52), ·). Accordingly, since the Vickrey
mechanism is dominant-strategy in the classical setting, it is a dominant strategy for i to report (78, 52) in the above
2-unit auction.
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5 The Third Theorem
Our third theorem shows that the worst-case social welfare performance of the Vickrey mecha-
nism is essentially optimal, in the Knightian setting, relative to all possible undominated-strategy
mechanisms.
Note that, in principle, there may be an undominated-strategy mechanism M missing the
maximum social welfare by at most δm.11 Our upcoming Theorem 3, however, rules out the
existence of such mechanisms, so long as they give each player a finite set of strategies.12
We stress that Theorem 3 applies not just to finite mechanisms eliciting a single valuation
from each player, but to all finite mechanisms, including those allowing a player to report a set of
valuations. Thus, in our Knightian valuation model, the social welfare optimality of the Vickrey
mechanism (which allows a player to report only a single valuation) may be surprising.
We could simply state Theorem 3 by saying that, for every finite mechanism M , there exists
a profile of δ-approximate candidate sets for which M misses the maximum social welfare by
essentially 2mδ: more precisely, by 2mδ(1 − 1/n) + ε, where ε is an arbitrarily small positive
constant. To be more informative, however, we wish to state Theorem 3 so as to highlight the
candidate set profiles causing this maximal loss in social welfare.
Let V and W be two sets of real numbers (with diameter at most δ and with at least two
elements in common), whose union has diameter at least 2δ−ε/m. For instance, V = [x− δ, x] and
W = [x−2δ+ε/m, x−δ+ε/m]. Then, the following definition expresses that for each player there
are at least two candidate sets, one for which the value of each copy of the good is in V , and one
for which that the value of each copy of the good is in W . More precisely, recalling that Ki is the
set of all possible candidate sets of player i, that K = (K1, . . . ,Kn), and that in a δ-approximate
multi-unit Knightian auction K ⊆ Kδ, we have the following
Definition 5.1. In a δ-approximate multi-unit Knightian auction, K is ε-basic if there exist two
subsets V and W of non-negative numbers such that
(a) maxV −minV ≤ δ and maxW −minW ≤ δ,
(b) |V ∩W | > 1 and maxV −minW ≥ 2δ − ε/m, and
(c) for every player i, Ki contains the following two candidate sets
K˜i
def
= {θi ∈ Θi | ∀j, θi(j) ∈ V } and K˜ ′i def= {θi ∈ Θi | ∀j, θi(j) ∈W} .
Example 5.2. Consider a 3-unit 10-approximate Knightian auction, in which for each player i, Ki
includes the following two candidate sets:
[88, 98]× [88, 98]× [88, 98] and
[80, 90]× [80, 90]× [80, 90] .
Then, K is 6-basic (corresponding to V = [88, 98] and W = [80, 90]).
There is no magic about the choice of the numbers 80 and 88 in the above example. The main
point is that the intersection of the two intervals [80, 90] and [88, 98] coincides with the interval
[88, 90], whose length is ε/m = 6/3 = 2.
11For instance, a mechanism M could achieve such performance by asking each player i to report a single valuation,
and incentivizing him to report a valuation vi which is the ‘mid-point’ of his candidate set Ki: i.e., vi(j) =
1
2
(K⊥i (j)+
K>i (j)) for all j ∈ [m].
12This finiteness restriction, although crucial for our proof, is quite mild in practice (and is indeed natural when
mechanisms are implemented via computers). The Vickrey mechanism itself becomes finite if it explicitly asks each
player to report, for each copy of the good, an integral number of cents between 0 and 10100.
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Theorem 3. In a multi-unit Knightian auction, for all δ > 0, all ε > 0, all ε-basic K ⊆ Kδ,
all (possibly probabilistic) finite mechanisms M , there exist products K ∈ K, valuation profiles
θ ∈ K, and undominated strategy profiles s ∈ UD(K), such that
E
[
SW(θ,M(s))
] ≤ MSW(θ)− 2δm(1− 1/n) + ε .
Above, the expectation is over the possible random choices of the mechanism M .
The proof of Theorem 3 can be found in Appendix E. Although mechanism finiteness is a natural
restriction in practice, we wish to remark that Theorem 3 continues to hold under alternative but
more complex assumptions.13
Appendix
A Knightian Revelation Principle
Let us explicitly show that a version of the revelation principle [15, 9, 25] holds also in our Knightian
setting. Recall that Ki is the set of all possible candidate sets for player i.
Definition A.1. Let M be a mechanism in which Si is the set of actions of player i. Then, the
profile of functions
(
si : Ki → ∆(Si)
)
i
is an ex-post (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium of M if for
all K ∈ K, all players i, all ai ∈ Si, and all θi ∈ Ki,
Ui(θi,M(si(Ki), s−i(K−i))) ≥ Ui(θi,M(ai, s−i(K−i))) .
Lemma A.2 (Revelation Principle). Let M be a mechanism that has an ex-post Nash equilib-
rium s. Then, there exists a Knightian DST mechanism M ′ such that
∀K ∈ K M ′(K1, . . . ,Kn) = M(s1(K1), . . . , sn(K1)) .
Proof. Let M ′ be the Knightian direct mechanism so defined:
∀K ∈ K M ′(K1, . . . ,Kn) def= M(s1(K1), . . . , sn(K1)) .
(The above equality is between distributions if M is probabilistic.)
All that is left to prove is that the mechanism M ′ is dominant-strategy truthful. To this end,
let Ki be the true candidate set of player i. Then, for all K
′
i ∈ Ki, all θi ∈ Ki, and all K−i ∈ K−i,
U
(
θi,M
′(Ki,K−i)
)
= U
(
θi,M(si(Ki), s−i(K−i))
)
≥ U(θi,M(si(K ′i), s−i(K−i))) = U(θi,M ′(K ′i,K−i)) ,
where the inequality follows from Definition A.1 of the ex-post Nash equilibrium by setting ai =
si(K
′
i). This completes the proof. 
Because every dominant-strategy mechanism must have an ex-post Nash equilibrium (consisting
of each player choosing his dominant strategy), the above theorem holds also when M is a dominant-
strategy mechanism.
13As it will become clear from our proof, Theorem 3 also holds for all bounded mechanisms such that, for all
players i, the strategy set Si is a compact Hausdorff space and, for all copies j, the families of allocation functions{
MAi,j(si, ·)
}
si∈Si and price functions
{
MPi (si, ·)
}
si∈Si are equicontinuous. However, the Vickrey mechanism can be
trivially modified to be finite, but not trivially made equicontinuous.
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B Proof of Theorem 1
We start by proving, as a separate claim, that Theorem 1 holds in the case of adjacent (instead of
connected) candidate sets. Namely,
Claim B.1. For every player i, every two adjacent candidate sets Ki,K
′
i ∈ Ki of i, and every
subprofile K−i of candidate sets for i’s opponents,
MAi,j(Ki,K−i) = M
A
i,j(K
′
i,K−i) and M
P
i (Ki,K−i) = M
P
i (K
′
i,K−i) .
Proof. Because the true candidate set of player i may coincide with Ki, and because, when this is
the case, reporting Ki should dominate reporting K
′
i, we have that, for all θ
′′
i ∈ Ki, the following
inequality holds:
m∑
j=1
MAi,j(Ki,K−i) ·
j∑
`=1
θ′′i (`)−MPi (Ki,K−i) ≥
m∑
j=1
MAi,j(K
′
i,K−i) ·
j∑
`=1
θ′′i (`)−MPi (K ′i,K−i). (B.1)
Similarly, because the true candidate set of player i may coincide with K ′i, and because, when
this is the case, reporting K ′i should dominate reporting Ki, we also have that, for all θ
′′
i ∈ K ′i, the
following inequality holds:
m∑
j=1
MAi,j(K
′
i,K−i) ·
j∑
`=1
θ′′i (`)−MPi (K ′i,K−i) ≥
m∑
j=1
MAi,j(Ki,K−i) ·
j∑
`=1
θ′′i (`)−MPi (Ki,K−i). (B.2)
Next, for every pair of valuations θi, θ
′
i ∈ Ki ∩ K ′i, we choose θ′′i = θi in inequality (B.1) and
θ′′i = θ
′
i in inequality (B.2). Summing up the resulting inequalities, the M
P
i price terms cancel out,
yielding the following inequality:
m∑
j=1
MAi,j(Ki,K−i) ·
j∑
`=1
(
θi(`)− θ′i(`)
) ≥ m∑
j=1
MAi,j(K
′
i,K−i) ·
j∑
`=1
(
θi(`)− θ′i(`)
)
. (B.3)
Similarly, setting θ′′i = θ
′
i in (B.1) and θ
′′
i = θi in (B.2), and summing up the resulting inequalities,
we deduce that:
m∑
j=1
MAi,j(Ki,K−i) ·
j∑
`=1
(
θi(`)− θ′i(`)
) ≤ m∑
j=1
MAi,j(K
′
i,K−i) ·
j∑
`=1
(
θi(`)− θ′i(`)
)
. (B.4)
(B.3) and (B.4) together imply, after some rearrangement of the terms, that
m∑
j=1
(
MAi,j(Ki,K−i)−MAi,j(K ′i,K−i)
)
·
( j∑
`=1
θi(`)− θ′i(`)
)
= 0 . (B.5)
Now, let us denote by a them-dimensional vector such that aj
def
=
∑m
k=jM
A
i,k(Ki,K−i)−MAi,k(K ′i,K−i)
for every j ∈ [m]. Then, (B.5) can be re-written as saying that the following inner product between
two vectors is zero: (
a1, . . . , am
) · (θi(1)− θ′i(1), . . . , θi(m)− θ′i(m)) = 0 . (B.6)
Finally, using our assumption that the vectors
(
θi(1) − θ′i(1), . . . , θi(m) − θ′i(m)
)
span the entire
Rm, we easily conclude that (a1, . . . , am) = (0, . . . , 0), which in turn implies the desired equality of
the allocation probabilities: MAi,j(Ki,K−i) = M
A
i,j(K
′
i,K−i). Plugging this equality into (B.1) and
(B.2) immediately yields the desired equality of the prices: MPi (Ki,K−i) = M
P
i (K
′
i,K−i). 
It is now straightforward to see that Theorem 1 follows by the definition of connected candidate
sets, and the repeated applications of the above claim. Namely, recall that Ki,K
′
i ∈ Ki are
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connected if there exist K
(1)
i , . . . ,K
(t)
i ∈ Ki such that Ki = K(1)i , K ′i = K(t)i , and K(k)i is adjacent
to K
(k+1)
i for all k ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1}. Therefore, we conclude that, for all j ∈ [m],
MAi,j(K
(1)
i ,K−i) = M
A
i,j(K
(2)
i ,K−i) = · · · = MAi,j(K(t)i ,K−i) ,
and similarly that
MPi (K
(1)
i ,K−i) = M
P
i (K
(2)
i ,K−i) = · · · = MPi (K(t)i ,K−i) . 
C Proof of Theorem 2
Recall that the Vickrey mechanism is direct, that is, Si = Θi for all players i. Recall also that
multi-unit auctions have non-increasing marginal valuations, that is, θi(1) ≥ θi(2) ≥ · · · ≥ θi(m) for
each θi ∈ Θi. Therefore, K⊥i (1), . . . ,K⊥i (m) and K>i (1), . . . ,K>i (m) are non-decreasing sequences.
That is, K>i ,K
⊥
i ∈ Θi. Accordingly, both K>i and K⊥i are valid reports for player i in the Vickrey
mechanism.
We start by proving, by contradiction, that
vi ∈ UDi(Ki) =⇒ vi(j) ≥ K⊥i (j) for all j ∈ [m]. (C.1)
Assume that implication (C.1) is false; let j∗ ∈ [m] be the first coordinate j such that vi(j) < K⊥i (j);
and define the function v∗i : [m]→ R≥0 as follows:
v∗i (j) =
{
vi(j), if j 6= j∗;
K⊥i (j), if j = j
∗.
Since vi and K
⊥
i are monotonically non-increasing, so is v
∗
i . Indeed,
• if j∗ > 1, then v∗i (j∗ − 1) = vi(j∗ − 1) ≥ K⊥i (j∗ − 1) ≥ K⊥i (j∗) = v∗i (j∗)
• if j∗ < m, then v∗i (j∗) = K⊥i (j∗) > vi(j∗) ≥ vi(j∗ + 1) = v∗i (j∗ + 1) .
Thus also v∗i is a valid valuation in Θi. We now reach a contradiction by showing that v
∗
i weakly
dominates vi, that is,
∀ θi ∈ Ki ∀ v−i Ui
(
θi,Vickrey(v
∗
i , v−i)
) ≥ Ui(θi,Vickrey(vi, v−i)) , (C.2)
∃ θ′i ∈ Ki ∃ v′−i Ui
(
θ′i,Vickrey(v
∗
i , v
′
−i)
)
> Ui
(
θ′i,Vickrey(vi, v
′
−i)
)
. (C.3)
To show (C.2), choose arbitrarily v−i ∈ Θ−i, and consider the following two cases:
(1) In Vickrey(v∗i , v−i) and Vickrey(vi, v−i), i receives the same number of copies.
In this case, inequality (C.2) holds because its two sides are equal for all θi.
(2) In Vickrey(v∗i , v−i) and Vickrey(vi, v−i), i receives different numbers of copies.
In this case, one can carefully verify that player i wins j∗ copies of the good in Vickrey(v∗i , v−i)
and only j∗ − 1 copies in Vickrey(vi, v−i).14 Thus, (C.2) holds because of the following two
reasons:
14Recall that, when each player reports a valuation vi, the Vickrey mechanism orders the nm values {vi(j) | i ∈
[n], j ∈ [m]} (breaking ties lexicographically), and allocates the m copies of the good by looking at the first m values
in this order. Since the only difference between v∗i and vi is that v
∗
i (j
∗) > vi(j∗), the ordering of the reported nm
values is minimally affected. That is, if player i receives different numbers of copies in outcome (vi, v−i) and outcome
(v∗i , v−i), then it must be that vi(j
∗) is outside the largest m numbers under (vi, v−i), but v∗i (j
∗) is within the largest
m numbers under (v∗i , v−i). This implies that i wins j
∗−1 copies in Vickrey(vi, v−i) but j∗ copies in Vickrey(v∗i , v−i).
12
• i’s price for his extra j∗-th copy of the good is ≤ K⊥i (j∗).
Indeed, Vickrey guarantees that i pays for his j∗-th copy at most the value he reports for
it. That is, for his j∗-th copy, i pays at most v∗i (j
∗), which in turn is equal to K⊥i (j
∗).
• i’s value for this j∗-th copy is ≥ K⊥i (j∗).
Indeed, for any candidate valuation θi in Ki, θi(j
∗) ≥ K⊥i (j∗).
Therefore, inequality (C.2) holds. Let us now show that also inequality (C.3) holds. To do so, we
need to construct a ‘witness’ candidate valuation θ′i ∈ Ki and a ‘witness’ strategy sub-profile v′−i.
In fact, we construct some v′−i so that (C.3) holds for all θ
′
i. Let v
′
−i be the strategy subprofile in
which, for every player k 6= i,
∀j ∈ [m] v′k(j) def= x def=
vi(j
∗) +K⊥i (j
∗)
2
< K⊥i (j
∗) .
Then, player i wins exactly j∗ copies in Vickrey(v∗i , v
′
−i) and pays x for each one of them; and wins
exactly j∗ − 1 copies in Vickrey(vi, v′−i) and pays x for each one of them. Indeed, there are exactly
j∗ − 1 numbers greater than x in vi, exactly j∗ in v∗i , and x is the reported value of every other
player, in v′−i, for every single copy of the good. As a result, i’s utility in Vickrey(v
∗
i , v
′
−i) is strictly
greater than that in Vickrey(vi, v
′
−i). This is so because in the outcome Vickrey(v
∗
i , v
′
−i), i pays an
extra price x for his j∗-th copy, while being guaranteed that his true valuation for the j∗-th copy,
θi(j
∗), is strictly larger than x, because x < K⊥i (j
∗) ≤ θi(j∗). Therefore, we conclude that (C.3)
holds for all candidate θ′i ∈ Ki and the above defined v′−i.
Since both (C.2) and (C.3) hold, valuation v∗i (weakly) dominates vi, contradicting the hypoth-
esis that vi ∈ UDi(Ki). This contradiction proves (C.1).
An absolutely symmetrical argument shows that15
vi ∈ UDi(Ki) =⇒ vi(j) ≤ K>i (j) for all j ∈ [m]. (C.4)
Together, statements (C.1) and (C.4) imply that all undominated strategies vi ∈ UDi(Ki) satisfy
vi(j) ∈ [K⊥i (j),K>i (j)] for each copy j.
Let us now prove the other direction: namely, that every strategy vi satisfying vi(j) ∈ [K⊥i (j),K>i (j)]
for each copy j is undominated for player i.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exists a valuation v∗i that weakly dominates
vi. We are going to derive a contradiction by showing that
∃ θ′i ∈ Ki ∃ v′−i Ui
(
θi,Vickrey(v
∗
i , v
′
−i)
)
< Ui
(
θi,Vickrey(vi, v
′
−i)
)
. (C.5)
Since, by the definition of weak dominance, v∗i must be different from vi, there are two (not
mutually exclusive) cases to consider:
(a) v∗i (j) > vi(j) for some j ∈ [m], and
(b) v∗i (j) < vi(j) for some j ∈ [m].
In case (a), let
• j∗ be the first coordinate j ∈ [m] such that v∗i (j) > vi(j),
• y be a real number such that v∗i (j∗) > y > vi(j∗), and
• ε be a real number in the open interval (0, y − vi(j∗)).
To show (C.5), we let θ′i be an arbitrary valuation in Ki satisfying θ
′
i(j
∗) ≤ vi(j∗) + ε. (Such a
valuation always exists since K⊥i (j
∗) = inf{θi(j∗) | θi ∈ Ki} ≤ vi(j∗).) Next, we construct the
required strategy sub-profile v′−i as follows: for each player k 6= i and each copy j, v′k(j)
def
= y. Let
us now compare player i’s utilities in the outcomes Vickrey(v∗i , v
′
−i) and Vickrey(vi, v
′
−i).
15In this symmetrical case, one needs to define j∗ ∈ [m] to be the last coordinate such that vi(j∗) > K>i (j).
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In Vickrey(v∗i , v
′
−i), i wins at least j
∗ copies, because v∗i (1) ≥ · · · ≥ v∗i (j∗) > y; moreover, he
pays y for each such copy, because y is the value that every other player reports, in v′−i, for every
single copy of the good. By contrast, in Vickrey(vi, v
′
−i), i wins exactly j
∗ − 1 copies, because
vi(1) ≥ · · · ≥ vi(j∗ − 1) ≥ v∗i (j∗ − 1) > y and vi(j∗) < y; moreover, he again pays y for each of
them. Thus, to prove that
Ui
(
θi,Vickrey(v
∗
i , v
′
−i)
)
< Ui
(
θi,Vickrey(vi, v
′
−i)
)
,
it suffices to point out that, for each copy j ≥ j∗ that i wins in Vickrey(v∗i , v′−i), i’s true value is
θ′i(j) ≤ θ′i(j∗) ≤ vi(j∗) + ε < y. This ends the proof of (C.5) in case (a).
In case (b), we instead let j∗ be the last coordinate j ∈ [m] such that v∗i (j) < vi(j). An
absolutely symmetrical argument shows that (C.5) also holds for this case.
In sum, Theorem 2 holds. 
D Proof of Corollary 1
Let v ∈ UD(K) be any profile of undominated strategies, and A = (A0, A1, . . . , An) represent the
allocation in the outcome Vickrey(v), where each player i receives Ai copies of the goods, and A0 is
the number of unallocated copies. For any θ ∈ K, let B = (B0, B1, . . . , Bn) represent the allocation
that maximizes social welfare under θ, i.e., B = arg maxB∈A
{∑n
i=1
∑Bi
`=1 θi(`)
}
. Then,
SW(θ,Vickrey(v)) =
n∑
i=1
Ai∑
`=1
θi(`)
(1)
≥
n∑
i=1
Ai∑
`=1
(
K>i (`)− δ
) (2)≥ n∑
i=1
Ai∑
`=1
(
vi(`)− δ
)
(3)
≥
( n∑
i=1
Ai∑
`=1
vi(`)
)
−mδ
(4)
≥
( n∑
i=1
Bi∑
`=1
vi(`)
)
−mδ
(5)
≥
( n∑
i=1
Bi∑
`=1
K⊥i (`)
)
−mδ
(6)
≥
( n∑
i=1
Bi∑
`=1
(θi(`)− δ)
)
−mδ
(7)
≥ MSW(θ)− 2mδ.
Above
• Inequality (1) holds because θ ∈ K, and thus θi(`) ≥ K⊥i (`) ≥ K>i (`)− δ;
• Inequality (2) holds by Theorem 2;
• Inequality (3) holds because we have only m copies of the good: ∑ni=1Ai ≤ m;
• Inequality (4) holds because the Vickrey mechanism maximizes social welfare with respect to
v, and thus, relative to v, (A0, . . . , An) is no worse than any other allocation, and in particular
no worse than (B0, . . . , Bn);
• Inequality (5) holds again by Theorem 2;
• Inequality (6) holds because θ ∈ K, and thus θi(`) ≤ K>i (`) ≤ K⊥i (`) + δ; and
• Inequality (7) holds because of the definition of MSW(θ) and the fact that ∑ni=1Bi ≤ m. 
E Proof of Theorem 3
E.1 A Structural Lemma
The following lemma applies to all finite mechanisms, including those that allow players to report
sets of valuations, or anything else. (Indeed, the revelation principle no longer holds for mechanisms
that are not dominant-strategy or ex-post Nash. Thus, we must be able to deal with general
mechanisms with arbitrary strategy spaces.)
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Lemma E.1. Let M be a finite mechanism and i a player, let x = (x1, . . . , xm) and y = (y1, . . . , ym)
be two valuations in Θi such that xj > yj for all copies j ∈ [m], and let Ki and K˜i be two candidate
sets for i such that,
∀ t ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} (x1, . . . , xt, yt+1, . . . , ym) ∈ Ki ∩ K˜i.16 (E.1)
Then, for every ε > 0, there are mixed strategies σi ∈ ∆(UDi(Ki)) and σ˜i ∈ ∆(UDi(K˜i)) such that,
for all s−i ∈ S−i and all j ∈ [m],∣∣MAi,j(σi, s−i)−MAi,j(σ˜i, s−i)∣∣ < ε .17
Proof. First of all, it is simple to see (but anyway proved in Appendix F) that for every finite
mechanism, the set of undominated strategies of a Knightian player is always non-empty. Therefore,
the sets UDi(Ki) and UDi(K˜i) are both non-empty. If there exists a common (pure) strategy
si ∈ UDi(Ki) ∩ UDi(K˜i), then setting σi = σ˜i = si proves Lemma E.1. Therefore, let us assume in
the rest of the proof that UDi(Ki) and UDi(K˜i) are totally disjoint.
Let si be a pure strategy in UDi(Ki). Then, UDi(Ki)∩UDi(K˜i) = ∅ implies that si 6∈ UDi(K˜i).
By definition, si 6∈ UDi(K˜i) implies the existence of a (possibly mixed) strategy σ˜i ∈ ∆(UDi(K˜i))
that (weakly) dominates si for player i with respect to candidate set K˜i. In symbols, as per
Definition 4.1, σ˜i (i,K˜i) si.
Next, we argue that
∃ τi ∈ ∆(UDi(Ki)) such that τi (i,Ki) σ˜i .18 (E.2)
Let us write the possibly mixed strategy σ˜i as a sum of pure ones, σ˜i =
∑
t∈X α
(t)s˜
(t)
i . Here, X
is a finite index set, each s˜
(t)
i is a pure strategy from UDi(K˜i), each α
(t) > 0, and
∑
t∈X α
(t) = 1.
Invoking again the disjointedness of UDi(Ki) and UDi(K˜i), we deduce that s˜
(t)
i 6∈ UDi(Ki) for each
t ∈ X. This implies the existence of a strategy τ (t)i ∈ ∆(UDi(Ki)) such that τ (t)i (i,Ki) s˜(t)i . Thus,
by defining τi
def
=
∑
t∈X α
(t)τ
(t)
i , we have that τi dominates σ˜i. Thus, (E.2) holds.
Similarly, we could argue that there exists some τ˜i ∈ ∆(UDi(K˜i)) such that τ˜i (i,K˜i) τi. Con-
tinuing in this fashion, going back and forth between ∆(UDi(Ki)) and ∆(UDi(K˜i)), we obtain an
infinite chain of (possibly repeating) strategies,
σ
(1)
i ≺(i,K˜i) σ˜
(1)
i ≺(i,Ki) σ(2)i ≺(i,K˜i) σ˜
(2)
i ≺(i,Ki) · · ·
This (weak) dominance chain implies the following utility inequalities: for all s−i ∈ S−i and all
k ∈ N:
∀θ˜i ∈ K˜i Ui
(
θ˜i,M(σ
(k)
i , s−i)
) ≤ Ui(θ˜i,M(σ˜(k)i , s−i))
∀θi ∈ Ki Ui
(
θi,M(σ˜
(k)
i , s−i)
) ≤ Ui(θi,M(σ(k+1)i , s−i)) (E.3)
Next, for every t ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}, we define
zt
def
= (zt,1, zt,2, . . . , zt,m)
def
= (x1, x2, . . . , xt, yt+1, . . . , ym) ∈ Ki ∩ K˜i .
Choosing θi = θ˜i = zt in (E.3), we obtain that for all s−i ∈ S−i and all k ∈ N,
Ui
(
θ˜i,M(σ
(k)
i , s−i)
) ≤ Ui(θ˜i,M(σ˜(k)i , s−i)) = Ui(θi,M(σ˜(k)i , s−i)) ≤ Ui(θi,M(σ(k+1)i , s−i)) .
16Recall that all valuations in Θi are non-increasing. Our chosen vectors (x1, . . . , xt, yt+1, . . . , ym) are indeed
non-increasing, because we have xj > yj and both x and y are non-increasing.
17In fact, Lemma E.1 can be strengthened to ensure that the prices are close too: namely,
∣∣MPi (σi, s−i) −
MPi (σ˜i, s−i)
∣∣ < ε. However, this strengthened version of Lemma E.1 is not needed in order to prove Theorem 3.
18Note that, while we have only defined what it means for a pure strategy to be dominated by a possibly mixed
one, the definition trivially extends to the case of dominated strategies that are mixed, as is the case in “τi (i,Ki) σ˜i”
in (E.2).
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Putting together the above inequalities for k = 1, 2, . . . , we get the following infinite and non-
decreasing sequence of real numbers (for each s−i ∈ S−i):
Ui
(
zt,M(σ
(1)
i , s−i)
) ≤ Ui(zt,M(σ˜(1)i , s−i)) ≤ Ui(zt,M(σ(2)i , s−i)) ≤ · · ·
This sequence is upperbounded by x1 + · · · + xm. (Indeed, zt,l ≤ xl for each l. So, the i’s
valuation is at most x1 + · · ·+ xm, while i’s price is non-negative.) Thus, because of the Bolzano-
Weierstrass theorem (i.e., because any non-decreasing and upper bounded sequence of real numbers
must converge), for every s−i ∈ S−i and t ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}, letting D def= minl∈[m]{xl − yl}, there
must exist some H
(s−i,t)
ε ∈ N such that, for all k > H(s−i,t)ε :∣∣∣∣(∑j∈[m]MAi,j(σ(k)i , s−i)(∑jl=1zt,l)−MPi (σ(k)i , s−i))
−
(∑
j∈[m]M
A
i,j(σ˜
(k)
i , s−i)
(∑j
l=1zt,l
)−MPi (σ˜(k)i , s−i))∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣Ui(zt,M(σ(k)i , s−i))− Ui(zt,M(σ˜(k)i , s−i))∣∣ ≤ εD4 . (E.4)
At this point, we invoke the finiteness of the mechanism in order to define the following maximum
value:
Hε
def
= max
{
H
(s−i,t)
ε : s−i ∈ S−i, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}
} ∈ N .
As a result, (E.4) holds for every k > Hε, s−i ∈ S−i, and t ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}. We now claim that,
by picking an arbitrary k > Hε, the strategies σ
(k)
i and σ˜
(k)
i must be the two ‘sufficiently close’
strategies we are looking for.
To prove this, consider an arbitrary strategy subprofile s−i ∈ S−i and an integer t ∈ [m], and
apply (E.4) twice, once for t and once for t − 1. Combining the resulting two inequalities and
applying the triangle inequality, we have:19
εD
2
≥
∣∣∣∣ (∑j∈[m]MAi,j(σ(k)i , s−i)(∑jl=1zt,l)−MPi (σ(k)i , s−i))
−
(∑
j∈[m]M
A
i,j(σ˜
(k)
i , s−i)
(∑j
l=1zt,l
)−MPi (σ˜(k)i , s−i))
−
(∑
j∈[m]M
A
i,j(σ
(k)
i , s−i)
(∑j
l=1zt−1,l
)−MPi (σ(k)i , s−i))
+
(∑
j∈[m]M
A
i,j(σ˜
(k)
i , s−i)
(∑j
l=1zt−1,l
)−MPi (σ˜(k)i , s−i)) ∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣(∑mj=tMAi,j(σ(k)i , s−i)(xt − yt))− (∑mj=tMAi,j(σ˜(k)i , s−i)(xt − yt))∣∣∣∣
= (xt − yt)
∣∣∣∣(∑mj=tMAi,j(σ(k)i , s−i))− (∑mj=tMAi,j(σ˜(k)i , s−i))∣∣∣∣ ,
which further implies, using xt − yt ≥ D > 0, that∣∣∣∣(∑mj=tMAi,j(σ(k)i , s−i))− (∑mj=tMAi,j(σ˜(k)i , s−i))∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε2 . (E.5)
Let us now use (E.5) to argue that the following set of inequalities hold:
∀t ∈ [m]
∣∣∣MAi,t(σ(k)i , s−i)−MAi,t(σ˜(k)i , s−i)∣∣∣ ≤ ε . (E.6)
Indeed, for t = m, (E.6) can be derived by plugging t = m into (E.5). Else, for each t ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,m − 1}, we apply (E.5) twice, once for t and once for t + 1, and again combine the
resulting inequalities with the triangle inequality to deduce (E.6).
19That is, |a− b| ≤ ε and |c− d| ≤ ε imply |(a− b)− (c− d)| ≤ 2ε.
16
This completes the proof of Lemma E.1. 
E.2 Deducing Theorem 3 from Lemma E.1
Because K is ε-basic, let V and W be the corresponding subsets of reals from Definition 5.1. Denote
by a, b ∈ V ∩W any two disjoint reals in V ∩W such that a > b. For each player i, consider the
following two δ-approximate candidate sets
K˜i
def
= {θi ∈ Θi | ∀j, θi(j) ∈ V } and K˜ ′i def= {θi ∈ Θi | ∀j, θi(j) ∈W} ,
and according to the ε-basic assumption on Ki, we have K˜i, K˜ ′i ∈ Ki. Next, consider the following
two valuations that belong to Θi for every i:
x = (a, a, . . . , a) and y = (b, b, . . . , b) .
It is simple to verify that x, y, K˜i and K˜
′
i satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma E.1 (or more precisely,
(E.1)). Thus, for any ε′ > 0, the following holds:
for all i ∈ [n] there exist σi ∈ ∆(UDi(K˜i)) and σ′i ∈ ∆(UDi(K˜ ′i)) such that
∀s−i ∈ S−i ∀j ∈ [m]
∣∣∣MAi,j(σi, s−i)−MAi,j(σ′i, s−i)∣∣∣ < ε′ . (E.7)
Consider the allocation of M under the strategy profile σ′ = (σ′1, σ′2, . . . , σ′n). Because there
are m copies of the good, there ought to be one player who, in expectation, receives no more than
m
n copies. Without loss of generality, let him be player 1: that is,
∑m
j=1 j ·MA1,j(σ′1, . . . , σ′n) ≤ mn .
Thus, by (E.7) and multiple applications of the triangle inequality, we have
m∑
j=1
j ·MA1,j(σ1, σ′−1) ≤
m
n
+ ε′m2 .
By averaging, there exists a pure strategy profile s = (s1, s−1) in the support of (σ1, σ′−1) satisfying
m∑
j=1
j ·MA1,j(s1, s−1) ≤
m
n
+ ε′m2 . (E.8)
Now let
K
def
= (K1, . . . ,Kn), where Ki
def
=
{
K˜1 if i = 1
K˜ ′i if i = 2, . . . , n
θ
def
= (θ1, . . . , θn), where θi
def
=
{(
maxV, . . . ,maxV
)
if i = 1(
minW, . . . ,minW
)
if i = 2, . . . , n.
Because we know that (σ1, σ
′−1) ∈ ∆(UD1(K1))×· · ·×∆(UDn(Kn)) from (E.7), we deduce that
s ∈ UD(K). It is also obvious that θ ∈ K and MSW(θ) = m ·maxV .
Next, we show that s, K, and θ satisfy the desired inequality of Theorem 3. Indeed,
E
[
SW
(
θ,M(s)
)] (∗)≤ (m
n
+ ε′m2
)
·maxV +
(
m− m
n
− ε′m2
)
·minW
= mmaxV −
(
m− m
n
− ε′m2
)
(maxV −minW )
≤ mmaxV −
(
m− m
n
− ε′m2
)
(2δ − ε
m
)
= MSW(θ)− 2δm(1− 1/n)+ 2δε′m2 + ε
m
(
m− m
n
− ε′m2
)
≤ MSW(θ)− 2δm(1− 1/n)+ ε+ 2δε′m2 − ε
n
.
17
Above, inequality (∗) holds because, when θ is the true-valuation profile, the value for each copy
of the good is maxV for player 1, and is minW for every player other than player 1. However, in
the outcome M(s), owing to (E.8), in expectation player 1 can receive at most mn + ε
′m2 copies of
the good.
Finally, noticing that ε′ > 0 can be arbitrarily small, we can choose ε′ to satisfy 2δε′m2− εn ≤ 0.
This implies that E
[
SW
(
θ,M(s)
)] ≤ MSW(θ) − 2δm(1 − 1/n) + ε. Therefore, Theorem 3 holds.

F The Set of Undominated Strategies is Non-Empty
It is trivial to see that, no matter what candidate set Ki a player i may have, UDi(Ki) is non-
empty in the Vickrey mechanism. In fact, Theorem 2 implies that UDi(Ki) includes at least all the
valuations in Ki.
Below, we argue that UDi(Ki) is also always non-empty for all finite mechanisms.
Fact F.1. Let M be a finite mechanism, i a player, and Ki a candidate set of i. Then, UDi(Ki) 6=
∅.
Proof. Let Si = {s1, . . . , st} be the finite pure-strategy set of player i. We proceed by contradiction.
Suppose that every strategy in Si is (weakly) dominated, with respect to Ki, by some strategy in
∆(Si). Then, in particular, s1 is dominated. Thus, there exists a mixed strategy
∑t
k=1 αksk ∈ ∆(Si)
such that
s1 ≺(i,Ki)
t∑
k=1
αksk , (F.1)
where α ∈ ∆ def= {x ∈ [0, 1]t | ∑tk=1 xk = 1}. Notice that, by condition (2) in Definition 4.1, we
cannot have s1 ≺(i,Ki) s1. Therefore, we must have α1 < 1. Now, we simplify (F.1) by subtracting
α1s1 on both sides and rescaling:
s1 ≺(i,Ki)
t∑
k=2
αk
1− α1 sk . (F.2)
Next, since s2 is dominated, let it be dominated by
∑t
k=1 βksk. In symbols,
s2 ≺(i,Ki)
t∑
k=1
βksk (F.3)
for some β ∈ ∆. By substituting (F.2) into (F.3), we can rewrite (F.3) as
s2 ≺(i,Ki)
t∑
k=2
β′ksk (F.4)
for some β′ ∈ ∆ such that β′1 = 0. Again, by subtracting β′2s2 on both sides and rescaling, we
obtain
s2 ≺(i,Ki)
t∑
k=3
β′′ksk , (F.5)
for some β′′ ∈ ∆ such that β′′1 = β′′2 = 0. We substitute (F.5) into (F.2), and obtain
s1 ≺(i,Ki)
t∑
k=3
α′ksk ,
for some α′ ∈ ∆ such that α′1 = α′2 = 0.
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This process, similar to Gaussian elimination in linear systems, can be continued until we obtain
sk ≺(i,Ki) st for every k = 1, . . . , t − 1. Thus, st must be an undominated strategy for player i,
contradicting the hypothesis that UDi(Ki) = ∅. 
G The Work of Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon
Their Model. In order to “strip away issues pertaining to higher order beliefs and strategic
uncertainty”, Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon [21] focus on single-player mechanisms. Thus, so do
we when recalling their work.
In their model, true state of the world comprises all the information the player is uncertain
about, and the player’s utility function, U , maps O × T × S to R, where
(a) O is the set of all possible outcomes,
(b) T
def
= [0, 1] is the set of all possible player types, and
(c) S is the set of all possible true states of the world.
When the player’s type is t ∈ T , the only information the player has about the true state of the
world s ∈ S is that s is drawn from a distribution Π(t) in ∆(S).
In their model, the player knows his own type t ∈ T , and a mechanism knows the true state of
the world s ∈ S. The player is allowed to report just his own type, and then a mechanism chooses
an outcome based not only on this report, but also on the true state: that is, each mechanism φ is
a function φ : T × S → O.
By contrast, in our auction setting, a mechanism chooses an outcome solely based on the players’
reports. Indeed, since each player is uncertain about his own valuation, the true state of the world
should include the true valuation profile θ∗, and if a mechanism knew θ∗, then it would be trivial
to choose an outcome of maximum social welfare.
In their Knightian setting, they provide a general notion of a dominant-strategy mechanism,
optimal incentive compatibility (optimal IC), and a very restrictive notion of a dominant-strategy
mechanism, ex-post incentive compatibility (ex-post IC). Formally, a mechanism φ is
• optimal IC if, ∀t ∈ T , ∀σ ∈ ∆(T ), and ∀pi ∈ Π(t): Es∼pi
[
U(φ(t, s), t, s)
] ≥ Es∼pi[Eθ∼σ[U(φ(θ, s), t, s)]],
and
• ex-post IC if, ∀t, θ ∈ T and ∀s ∈ S: U(φ(t, s), t, s) ≥ U(φ(θ, s), t, s).
Their First Theorem. They assume that, for every type t ∈ T , there exists a neighborhood
N(t) ⊂ T such that, for all continuous functions g : S → R,
if
∫
S
g(s)dpi = 0 for every pi ∈
⋂
t′∈N(t)
Π(t′), then g = 0.
Under this assumption, their first theorem shows that every optimal IC mechanism satisfying an
additional technical condition (i.e., ex-post cyclical monotonicity) must be ex-post IC.
Therefore, their first theorem has the same spirit of our Theorem 1. In both theorems, some
form of overlapping of a player’s possible ‘belief/knowledge sets’ implies that every dominant-
strategy mechanism must be of a very restrictive form. However, due to the differences in models
and assumptions, it is unclear whether our already simple proof of Theorem 1 can be more simply
derived from theirs. Even ignoring all other differences, there cannot be any subjective map from
their type space to ours. In their case, a player’s type space (i.e., T = [0, 1]) has the cardinality of
the continuum. In our case, the type space of a given player i (i.e., Ki) may have the cardinality
of the power set of the continuum.
19
References
[1] Robert J. Aumann. Utility theory without the completeness axiom. Econometrica, 30(3):445–
462, July 1962.
[2] Lawrence M. Ausubel and Paul Milgrom. The lovely but lonely vickrey auction. In Peter
Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg, editors, Combinatorial Auctions, page Ch. 1.
MIT Press, 2006.
[3] Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, and Elan Pavlov. Single-value combinatorial auctions and imple-
mentation in undominated strategies. In SODA ’06: Proceedings of the 17th Annual ACM-
SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 1054–1063, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
[4] Truman F. Bewley. Knightian decision theory. Part I. Decisions in Economics and Finance,
25(2):79–110, 2002. Earlier version appeared as discussion paper no. 807 of the Cowles Foun-
dation at Yale University, November 1986.
[5] Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed. Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design. Games and Economic
Behavior, 75(2):518–537, 2012.
[6] Subir Bose, Emre Ozdenoren, and Andreas Pape. Optimal auctions with ambiguity. Theoretical
Economics, 1(4):411–438, December 2006.
[7] Subir Bose and Ludovic Renou. Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices.
Econometrica, 82(5):1853–1872, 2014.
[8] Eric Danan. Randomization vs. selection: How to choose in the absence of preference? Man-
agement Science, 56:503–518, March 2010.
[9] Partha S. Dasgupta, Peter J. Hammond, and Eric S. Maskin. The implementation of social
choice rules: Some general results on incentive compatibility. Review of Economic Studies,
46(2):185–216, April 1979.
[10] Alfredo Di Tillio, Nenad Kos, and Matthias Messner. The design of ambiguous mechanisms.
Technical report, 2012.
[11] Juan Dubra, Fabio Maccheroni, and Efe A. Ok. Expected utility theory without the complete-
ness axiom. Journal of Economic Theory, 115(1):118–133, March 2004.
[12] Vincy Fon and Yoshihiko Otani. Classical welfare theorems with non-transitive and non-
complete preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 20(3):409–418, June 1979.
[13] Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole. Game theory. 1991. MIT Press, 1991.
[14] D. Gale and A. Mas-Colell. An equilibrium existence theorem for a general model without
ordered preferences. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2(1):9–15, March 1975.
[15] Allan Gibbard. Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica: journal of
the Econometric Society, pages 587–601, 1973.
[16] Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler. Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior. Journal
of Mathematical Economics, 18(2):141–153, April 1989.
20
[17] Matthew O. Jackson. Implementation in undominated strategies: A look at bounded mecha-
nisms. Review of Economic Studies, 59(4):757–75, October 1992.
[18] Matthew O. Jackson, Thomas Palfrey, and Sanjay Srivastava. Undominated Nash implemen-
tation in bounded mechanisms. Games and Economic Behavior, 6(3):474–501, 1994.
[19] Frank H. Knight. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Houghton Mifflin, 1921.
[20] Kevin Leyton-Brown and Yoav Shoham. Essentials of game theory: A concise multidisciplinary
introduction. Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning, 2(1):1–88,
2008.
[21] Giuseppe Lopomo, Luca Rigotti, and Chris Shannon. Uncertainty in mechanism design. Tech-
nical report, 2009.
[22] Giuseppe Lopomo, Luca Rigotti, and Chris Shannon. Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard.
Journal of Economic Theory, 146(3):1148 – 1172, 2011. Incompleteness and Uncertainty in
Economics.
[23] Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci, and Aldo Rustichini. Ambiguity aversion, robustness,
and the variational representation of preferences. Econometrica, 74(6):1447–1498, 2006.
[24] Andrew Mas-Colell. An equilibrium existence theorem without complete or transitive prefer-
ences. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1(3):237–246, December 1974.
[25] Roger B. Myerson. Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econometrica: journal
of the Econometric Society, pages 61–73, 1979.
[26] Leandro Nascimento. Remarks on the consumer problem under incomplete preferences. Theory
and Decision, 70(1):95–110, January 2011.
[27] Efe A. Ok. Utility representation of an incomplete preference relation. Journal of Economic
Theory, 104:429–449, 2002.
[28] Luca Rigotti and Chris Shannon. Uncertainty and risk in financial markets. Econometrica,
73(1):203–243, 01 2005.
[29] David Schmeidler. Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity. Economet-
rica, 57(3):571–87, May 1989.
[30] Wayne Shafer and Hugo Sonnenschein. Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered
preferences. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2(3):345–348, December 1975.
[31] William Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The Journal
of Finance, 16(1):8–37, 1961.
21
